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Madagascar rich and in-
transparent
“If you shut up truth, and bury it underground, it will but grow, 
and gather to itself such explosive power that the day it bursts 
through it will blow up everything in its way.”
     --Émile Zola--
Madagascar is one of the richest countries when it comes to 
natural and mineral resources. As is the case in many tropi-
cal countries, however, this wealth is bluntly coupled with an 
ever increasing poverty, where more than 92 %  of the 21 mil-
lion inhabitants are living below $US2 a day. Madagascar has 
received international aid and conservation interests for years, 
as part of which, millions of dollars have been donated to the 
country, but with very little to show for it (Horning 2008). When 
Madagascar appeared to hit rock bottom in 2009, a political 
coup d’état took place which led to the international donor 
community curtailing financial support (Randrianja 2012). 
During the following years, the transitional government did not 
receive the international support that the previous government 
had benefitted from. Here we will analyze the pattern of two 
cases of natural resource governance, both coinciding with a 
political event.
Case 1 pertains to rosewood: Since 2009, illegal logging 
and exporting of rosewood has reached unprecedented levels 
in Madagascar (Schuurman and Lowry 2009, Innes 2010, 
Randriamalala and Liu 2010) affecting the entire east coast, with 
highest intensity of pillage in the national parks of Masoala and 
Marojejy. In 2011, reportedly over 500,000 tons of rosewood 
were in stocks; discussions among experts at the global table 
revolved around a solution finding to best deal with these 
stocks (Randriamalala et al. 2011). However, the issue then went 
mysteriously silent to a remarkable degree for almost two years. 
In the meantime, the African Union supported by the interna-
tional community pushed the current government to organize 
presidential elections with a first round on 25 October 2013, 
and the second and final round scheduled for 20 December 
2013. Coincidently, in mid 2013 the World Bank requested a 
“Study to Assess the Options of Disposal of the Illicit Stocks of 
Rosewood and Ebony”1 issued 31 July 2013 with a deadline for 
the expressions of interest fixed at 13 August 2013.
During the last year, a new phenomenon has emerged: 
inventoried rosewood logs have slowly but regularly been 
ferreted out of the depots they were stored in. During the 
early months of 2013, traffickers from Maroantsetra visited the 
Masoala peninsula and generously offered 1 million MGA per 
household to turn a blind eye regarding any rosewood. Simul-
taneously, large vessels positioned just too far to be seen from 
any shore, were collecting logs transferred to them at night in 
smaller boats. Encouraged by the incredulous ineptitude on the 
part of the local legal authorities, this process has been ongoing, 
even during daylight hours, with the ‘mother ships’ eventually 
even clearly visible from the shores. The timber stocks in the 
known depots have almost been completely cleared out by 
now. At the end of September 2013 a petition was suddenly 
circulated by EIA (Environmental Investigation Agency) bearing 
the message “Urgent Sign - on To Stop Madagascar Illegal Sale of 
Massive Stockpiles of Rosewood and Ebony” that many people 
and international and national NGOs have signed2. Interestingly, 
the concerns revolved around the estimated value of stocks, 
whether they were worth US$5 billion or only US$600 million. 
The question which goes begging is, why is the World Bank 
suddenly trying to find a legal solution for the stocks, when 
they de facto have already been removed from Madagascar 
and transported to Asia? We propose the following hypotheses 
as some food for thought: (i) There is insufficient information 
to assess the quantity and value of the remaining stocks. If any 
stock does indeed remain, it does represent a threat to the 
natural resources, and in principle, conservation NGOs cannot 
support the legalizing of the sale of such stocks. This implies 
that in the past, the legalizing and therefore selling of timber 
held in stocks represented a threat to the remaining precious 
trees, i.e., it has led to further illegal logging (Randriamalala 
and Liu 2010). (ii) The stockpiled timber has already steadily 
and consistently been exported to China: the government, the 
conservation community, and the public are all cognizant of 
this. There is a complex financial arrangement proposed by the 
international funding agencies and promoters of democracy, 
to appease all the parties involved in the case of dealing in 
illegally-felled rosewood3. 
Hypothesis 1 appears naïve and almost unrealistic, given 
that the case is well known by all the parties involved. Hypoth-
esis 2 requires a deeper understanding of the financial, legal, 
and institutional mechanisms involved, since international 
funding agencies and the World Bank are not allowed to 
support an illegitimate government (i.e., one which assumed 
power through a coup d’état). The question which remains 
alludes to a problem which may be described as “wicked”, 
for lack of a better prescriptive (cf. Rittel and Webber 1973): 
how can someone make more money from a product which 
has already been sold?
We will try to shed some light by performing a reductio ad 
absurdum, which entails a step - by - step hypothetical appeas-
ing of every party or individual involved in the rosewood traf-
ficking process. To begin with, we ask the question: where 
do the interests of the various actors, really lie? This may be 
answered as follows: (i) Some, such as international funding 
agencies and NGOs seek a ‘green’ image. (ii) Others wish to 
be seen as promoters of democracy (western countries). (iii) 
Some are in a position of being in dire need of funding: they 
include certain NGOs and the Malagasy government. (iv) Some 
are lenders of money: these are the funding agencies and 
foreign governments. (v) There are some seeking to launder 
money, i.e., timber sellers and buyers.
To ‘green - wash’ the illegally - sourced logs, necessitates 
the issuance of a CITES permit, something which could be 
lobbied for by NGOs, who would then receive money from the 
funding agencies, officially to help them protect the wildlife. 
On the other hand, timber traders and buyers would thereby 
legalize their business, and push for the supporting of the 
required democratic process, i.e., the ongoing elections. 
Therefore, the value of the legalized stocks of wood would 
lie in its ‘greening - up’ of the buyers’ profiles, and allow some 
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of the laundered money to flow back to Madagascar so that 
‘business as usual’ could continue.
Let’s take a step back though: Hypothesis 2 appears to be in 
the realms of the absurd. The World Bank and other international 
funding agencies should not take such a risk: despite their inter-
ests to support democracy, development and conservation, they 
should not get involved in the green - washing of illegal timber. 
Furthermore, international NGOs should never invest effort in 
lobbying for a CITES permit allowing for sale of illegally logged 
ebony and rosewood. NGOs are well aware of the risks involved 
in such a procedure, and legalizing illegally-traded logs could 
potentially once again open up the forests to further illegal tree 
felling and trafficking. Which takes us back to square one: the 
million dollar question that goes begging pertains to the true 
level of transparency when it comes to the intentions of all 
parties involved in this process.
The second case is on a smaller scale, and concerns 
wetlands, which are among the most threatened ecosystems 
in Madagascar (Thieme et al. 2005, Rabearivony et al. 2010).
Case 2: Alaotra marshlands, vanishing in a puff of smoke? 
The Lake Alaotra wetland constitutes the biggest wetland 
system in Madagascar and is of national importance for its 
fish and rice production. About 23,000 hectares of marshlands 
fringe the lake, delivering crucial ecosystem services (water, 
plant material, fish stock) while hosting unique wildlife such 
as Hapalemur alaotrensis, the only primate species living 
constantly in marshland, or the recently described carnivore 
Salanoia durrelli, also adapted to wetland. International conser-
vation efforts have been ongoing since the 1990s to sustain this 
wetland biodiversity and ecosystem, leading to the inscription of 
the entire Alaotra wetland as the third Ramsar site in Madagas-
car in 2003. The government of Madagascar then acknowledged 
the system’s biodiversity and conservation values by classifying 
the wetland as a New Protected Area within national law N°381-
2007/ MINENVEF/MAEP on 17 January 2007. Though formally 
protected, there are increasing pressures on this wetland. The 
region is dominated by rice paddies, with all the terrain already 
claimed; the marshlands hence represent a future reservoir for 
rice production. The increasing scarcity in production capac-
ity is further accentuated by changing hydrologic balance and 
leads to an underproduction of the existing rice fields. This 
forces resource users further into the remaining marshlands. 
For example, the number of rice fields within the lakefront (the 
so called riz de contre-saison) has increased significantly in the 
past years (Ratsimbazafy et al. In press). The same accounts for 
the number of fires. According to the same authors, the years 
2000 and 2004 have been extreme fire years affecting more 
than 40% of the entire marshland area. In 2012, the number of 
fires from October to December exceeded 150 cases (ibid). The 
year 2013 appears set to break any previous records. According 
to MWC (Madagascar Wildlife Conservation) and DWCT (Durrell 
Wildlife Conservation Trust), the marshes are being burnt at an 
unprecedented level with, for example, a few fires affecting 
several hundred hectares within a few days in October 2013 
alone. The local management and monitoring entities such as 
VOI (Vondron’Olona Ifototra) and CFL (Comité Forestier Local) are 
hopelessly overwhelmed by the many fires, while national actors 
such as DWCT and MWC can only gather evidence to describe 
the breaches of the legal or regulatory framework that are being 
perpetrated. It is very interesting to note that marsh (and forest) 
fires have reached a peak during this electoral period, where 
some political actors have repeatedly been observed promising 
land in exchange for votes. Alaotra represents a case specifically 
where actors outside of the system, instigate local communities 
to burn marshland for the sake of rice production (Ratsimbazafy 
et al. In press). However it is difficult to judge clearly when 
the smoke is so heavy over the lake. As is the case with many 
other governments, the Malagasy government is faced with the 
challenge of balancing the interests of its citizens, which are 
often in stark contrast with those of players or parties within the 
international community. The value of Madagascar’s resource 
richness is measured differently by the different stakeholders, 
and thus governance of these natural resources has become 
increasingly more complex, and promises to do so even more in 
the near future. What constitutes a serious hindrance in sound 
governance is the fact that many of the processes are difficult 
to trace and assess due to an evident lack of transparency 
as discussed in these two cases. To strengthen governance 
depends first and foremost on the political will of the hosting 
country to improve its governance system, and hence to accept 
monitors to maintain observation over its performance. This 
however, requires a marked stepping up of transparency and 
accountability. At present, the bleak and questionable scenario 
painted by the above two cases presented here, seem to imply 
that for the people of Madagascar, its rich biodiversity may be 
more of a curse than a blessing.
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